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Topic: We have seen the expansion of the scope of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause starting roughly 
around 1937. Some are appalled by it, some think that the expansion is perfectly constitutional. Based on the cases from 
the midterm onwards, does the expansion make the federal power under the Commerce Clause virtually limitless as to 
undermine the states’ sovereignty? Pay special attention to the structural limit, if there is any, inherent in the Commerce 
Clause and/or the “aggregate effect” argument. 
In his concurring opinion for United States v. Lopez, Justice Clarence Thomas expressed his concern 
that Congress is in danger of having the power beyond its constitutional provision under the Commerce 
Clause. He referred to the Court’s trend of reading the Commerce Clause more broadly since the 
New Deal, evidenced by such opinions that upheld the adoption of the aggregate effect doctrine first 
explicitly conceptualized in Wickard v. Filburn. He further stipulated that the substantial effect principle 
coupled with the aggregate effect doctrine would put virtually “every aspect of human existence” under 
the federal government control.1 He was not alone in his apprehensiveness; among others, Chief Justice 
Hughes in Shechter Poultry Corp v. United States had previously warned the public of the danger of reading 
the Commerce Clause too broadly since at its face value, there seems to be no structural limit built 
into the Clause. However, this paper will show the Court has consistently acknowledged and remained 
faithful to the Clause’s inherent structural limits through a careful examination of the Supreme Court 
opinions regarding the following: unconstitutionality of the delegation of Commerce power, the nature 
of the legislative procedure of Congress, and the Court’s three concentric expansions of the reading of 
the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
One of the most pervasive limits inherent in the Commerce Clause is the limitation put on the 
delegation of the power to regulate interstate commerce. The limit here has been a rather strict one. The 
Court not only struck down the delegation of lawmaking power to the executive regarding the regulation 
of interstate commerce in Panama Refining Co. et al. v. Ryan et al., but, as evident in Justice Hughes’ opinion 
for Schechter, it also deemed that it is unconstitutional to “delegate legislative power to the President to 
exercise an unfettered discretion...” (emphasis added).2 As far as the Commerce Clause is concerned, 
even during the days of broader readings of the Commerce Clause (1937 - 1994), the Court remained 
steadfast to this limit on delegation of the Commerce power.  
But it begs the question whether the exclusivity of the Commerce power imposes any actual or 
realizable limit on the scope of Commerce Clause. Put it another way, will not the broader readings 
of the Commerce Clause from 1937 onward overpower any impact of the restriction on delegation 
of power would impose and render the federal government powerful enough to regulate everything 
and anything it wants? Two Court opinions suggest otherwise. First, in United States v. Lopez, Justice 
Kennedy contended that the restrictive effect of no- power-delegation policy is an enduring one for 
the Commerce Clause because it clarifies “discernible lines of political accountability”.3 After all, the 
ever expansive reading of the Commerce Clause is of concern to Justice Thomas and like-minded 
individuals in part due to the abstraction of who gets to exercise the power to regulate. It is not difficult 
to sympathize in concern if we were to take for granted that a nebulous central government official, 
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who is obscured from accountability, makes unguided regulatory decisions about various aspects of our 
lives. It is important to recognize here, then, that the Court has effectively addressed this concern by 
continuously sustaining that the power to exercise the interstate commerce regulatory power is exclusive 
to Congress and nontransferable without specified parameters. Such a limitation makes Congress, and 
only Congress, responsible for interstate commerce regulations and, in effect, increases the transparency 
and accountability. Secondly, Justice Blackmun’s opinion regarding the nature of legislative process 
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al., shows that by reserving the Commerce 
power exclusively for Congress, the Constitution fully integrates the States’ interest into the federal 
decision making process. Echoing Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion for National League of Cities v. 
Usery, Justice Blackmun specified that because the members of Congress are elected and re-elected by 
citizens of each State, “the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in 
all congressional action--the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in 
federal governmental action”.4 In other words, before exercising the “dangerous” power to regulate 
interstate commerce, Congress, as representatives, must deliberate by examining the issue at hand with 
respect to varying interests of each member’s constituencies. Even under the most expansive reading 
of the Commerce Clause, in this sense, the Court has fully acknowledged that Congress is limited in 
exercising its regulatory powers; the Constitution has provided the citizenry with procedural safeguards 
against the potentially despotic, unchecked federal regulation. 
The limit on the Commerce Clause discussed above appears to have one major shortcoming. 
Although the effect of non-delegation of Commerce power remains restrictive, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Lopez and United States v. Morrison suggest that standing alone, the Commerce Clause does 
not adequately protect the citizenry from Congress’ unconstitutional exercise of Commerce power. The 
Note from Harvard Law Review regarding the implications of Lopez explains why this may be the case: 
the political safeguards of federalism is diffused by such externalities as political compromises between 
many interest groups and the political actors’ ties to political ideologies.5 Indeed, the limitation we have 
discussed is not of the power itself but merely of the process in which that power may be exercised. The 
next logical step in exploring the landscape of the Commerce Clause, then, is to examine if the Supreme 
Court has recognized any inherent structure within the Clause that would provide further guidance in 
drawing a more definitive boundary around the regulatory power itself.
The scope of the regulatory power of Congress over interstate commerce has been contested mainly 
because of the ambiguity laden in the Commerce Clause. In Article I, Sec. 8, the Constitution reads “The 
Congress shall have Power...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian tribes”.6 By specifically enumerating  powers that could presumably be incorporated 
within a broader reading of “the power to regulate commerce among the several States”--such as the 
power to coin money and create post offices--the Constitution imposes a vague sense of limitation, but 
it actively avoids defining with precision the exact scope of that power. Just how much can Congress 
regulate? Can it regulate only the commerce that occurs strictly between States, or any regulation that 
affects interstate commerce? It is obvious that the structural limit of the Commerce Clause is that it 
should not be used as a blank check of infinite powers and that at the end of the day, the legislation 
has to be done for the sake of interstate commerce. The Court has abided by this limit as evidenced by 
the fact that each successive concentric expansion refers directly to how far the activity regulated and 
interstate commerce could be in order for the regulation to be considered for interstate commerce. 
 The expansion occurred in three concentric circles where the latter one captured the aspects 
of the prior ones and expanded upon them. The innermost of these was the inclusion of activities 
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(interstate or otherwise) that have “direct effect” on interstate commerce as can be observed in the 
majority opinions of Schechter and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. In Carter, Justice Sutherland made an explicit 
reference to this principle when he established that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 
was unconstitutional because the activity meant to be regulated was neither interstate in nature nor did 
it directly affect interstate commerce.7 But another question arises: with the Court deciding to strike 
down the congressional regulation in both Schechter and Carter, did the direct effect principle signal any 
real expansion? It is a tricky question to answer. The domain of the Commerce power was expanded in 
so much as that the Court admitted that Congress could now regulate non-interstate activities as long 
as those activities directly affect the interstate commerce. On the other hand, opinions offer very little 
help in delineating at what point an intrastate commercial activity is deemed to have a direct effect on 
interstate commerce as opposed to an indirect one. What is telling, however, is the forcefulness of the 
emphasis Justice Sutherland and Hughes placed on the importance of distinguishing those activities 
with direct effect from those with indirect effect on interstate commerce for the “maintenance of our 
constitutional system.” The only reasonable conclusion we can arrive at, it seems, is that the first phase 
of the expansive reading of the Commerce Clause was theoretical at best. And by assuming a more 
literalist approach to the words of the Constitution than later expansions, the Court convincingly 
limited the scope of the Commerce Clause to those activities that had a plainly obvious relationship 
to interstate commerce. 
The second expansion introduced a more actionable extension than the direct effect doctrine and 
let go of more – although some argue too much – of those limitations reinstated before 1937. From 
1937 decisions onwards, we see the Court adopting what Justice Clarence called the “substantial effect” 
principle. Unlike with the direct effect principle where the close “proximity” of the activity to be 
regulated to interstate commerce was of utmost concern, the substantial effect principle provides no 
explicit guideline as to how intimately the to-be-regulated activity needs to be related to the interstate 
commerce. Instead, as is evident in Justice Hughes’ opinion in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp. the validity of regulation appears to be wholly dependent on the size of the 
impact that the activity to be regulated will have on interstate Commerce.8 Furthermore, whereas the 
ambiguity of “direct effect” worked to limit Congress, the ambiguity of what constitutes “substantial” 
worked to enlarge the scope of the Commerce Clause to the point where, at its face value, Congress 
could assume all sorts of power under the pretext of the Commerce Clause. The majority opinion of 
the landmark case of US v. Darby only aggravates the growing apprehension. Here, Justice Stone went 
as far as to say that 
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters 
for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no 
restriction and  over which the courts are given no control...The power of 
Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce 
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation 
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise 
of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce... (emphasis 
added) 9
In effect, the Court declared itself unfit to pass judgment about legislations that have ulterior 
motives or purposes as long as their main objectives are to substantively protect and/or promote 
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interstate commerce. The critics of the substantial effect principle pointed out that the Court’s 
deference to Congress signifies an alarming expansion in Commerce Clause because the principle, as 
so understood, does not specify whether the activities even have to be commercial in nature to be 
legitimately regulated by Congress.10 Such a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, they argue, is 
tantamount to passively granting extra powers to Congress since the legislative branch is now equipped 
with the means with which to usurp of power once thought to be exclusively reserved for the States.
A further examination, however, reveals that the second expansion was consistently restricted by an 
important practical limit recognized in the first expansion. Namely, just as it holds true for the direct 
effect principle, the caveat of substantial effect principle is that the overarching objective of regulating 
an activity has to be for the protection and advancement of the interstate commerce.11 Furthermore, 
whereas the direct effect principle observed the structural limit of the Commerce Clause by mandating 
physical proximity between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, the substantial effect 
principle observed the limit by mandating sufficient (measured in magnitude) effect-relationship. As 
John Alexander notes, the magnitude requirement was observed strictly.12 Take for instance Lopez and 
Morrison. In both cases, justices reasoned that because the gun-control or discrimination-protection 
had “attenuated” effects on interstate commerce at best, legislations used the regulatory power over 
interstate commerce as a mere means to addressing the central concern – the police power. The limit, 
again, imposed a very realizable restriction on congressional action.
As Anthony Varona and Kevin Layton suggested in their symposium piece, however, the method 
of determining whether the magnitude of effect is sufficient seems to be too ambiguous to survive 
anything other than the infamous “I know it when I see it” test.13  Would it not be just as easy to argue 
that the Heart of Atlanta Hotel ultimately used to legally protect African Americans from the segregation 
as opposed to serving the interest of interstate commerce? It is important to note here how John 
Alexander further qualified the aggregate effect principle. He argued that faithful to the limitation the 
Court previously recognized, the Court seems to utilize a minimal proximity test in conjunction to 
the magnitude test to determine whether the regulation is for the benefit of interstate commerce or 
for something else entirely. For instance, Justice Rehnquist’s criterion stated that all of the regulated 
activities have to be at least “economic in nature”.14 By restricting the congressional regulatory power 
of non-commercial activities to those that are at least economic in nature, Justice Rehnquist effectively 
excluded the inclusion of powers that were traditionally reserved for the States (i.e. internal police power 
over criminal matters). Again, consistent with its precedents, the Court strictly observed the structural 
limits of the Commerce Clause.
The last of these expansions was the adoption of the aggregate effect principle, first championed in 
Wickard. Whereas the substantial effect principle was implied to apply to an activity that, standing alone, 
could substantially impact interstate commerce, the aggregate effect doctrine allows for the regulation 
of activities (commercial or otherwise) that may be insignificant by itself as long as that activity, if 
committed by many, can presumably affect interstate commerce. As duly noted in Justice Steven’s opinion 
for Raich, this principle is controversial for two main reasons. First, it explicitly expands the domain of 
Commerce Clause to those activities like growing your own wheat that are not only private but that also 
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have “trivial” effect--cannot be deemed to have substantial economic impact--on the market by itself.15 16 
Secondly, under this principle, the Court does not need to determine that non-commercial activities under 
regulation will have a substantial effect on the interstate commerce in aggregation but simply that there 
exist a “rational basis” for thinking so. Frankly, this is the broadest reading of the Commerce Clause thus 
examined; it is not at all difficult to sympathize with critics who take this principle to imply that most, if 
not all, of our daily activities are within the congressional power to regulate since in aggregate, anything 
can be presumed to have a notable impact on the interstate commerce.17 
Justice Stevens, however, was quick to deny such a “sweeping implication” and contended that just 
as it was with the substantial effect principle, the aggregate effect principle limits its applicability to those 
that have reasonable ties to interstate commerce.18 He specified what constitutes this “reasonable tie” in 
his opinion for Raich: the regulated activity, in aggregate, has to impose direct economic consequences 
on interstate commerce. Specifically, he reasoned that the Controlled Substance Act in question in Raich 
was “quintessentially economic”--and hence proved its tie to interstate commerce--since it regulated an 
activity that in aggregate “competed” with the heavily-regulated interstate marijuana market. Applied to 
Filburn, farmer Filburn’s action was “economic” in a sense that his home-grown wheat, together with 
those grown by other farmers following Filburn’s example, competed with the wheat market the price 
of which Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was trying to control. Moreover, the “reasonable-tie” 
limit provides an important guideline for understanding the aggregate principle since it can, consistent 
to the precedent, curb Congress from attempting to regulate whatever private activities it wishes such 
as sleeping. In particular, even in aggregate, whether people sleep one more hour or less cannot be 
reasonably argued to directly compete with some other regulatory policy on interstate commerce. But 
perhaps as a way of quelling further worries, the Court has also implicitly adopted the view that the 
activity, once conceptualized in aggregate, has to impose direct, reasonable impact on the interstate 
commerce.19 Such an implication is reflected in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion to Raich. He stated 
that unlike in Lopez, the regulation of private cultivation or possession of marijuana is “necessary and 
proper for the regulation of interstate commerce” as failure to do so will seriously jeopardize “the legitimate 
end of eradicating Schedule I substances from interstate commerce”.  In other words, the relationship 
between the activities to be regulated (imagined in aggregate) and interstate commerce has to be direct 
in so much as failure to regulate such an activity will harm interstate commerce. As it has been for more 
restrictive circles of expansion, the Court again established the necessity to prove the strength of the 
tie between the activity Congress enacted to regulate and interstate commerce in order to safeguard the 
States from the federal government’s despotic usurpation of power.
As can be observed in the close-examination of the discrete expansions of the reading of the 
Commerce Clause, at no point did the Court attempt to endow Congress, under the pretext of Commerce 
Clause, the power it was not originally guaranteed by the Constitution. In each concentric expansion, we 
see the Court adopting more liberal interpretations of the extent to which Congress can regulate activities 
in order to protect and advance interstate commerce. Yet, from the most restrictive reading--regulation of 
interstate activities and intrastate commercial activities that have direct effect on the interstate commerce-
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-to the most liberal reading--regulation of private, non-commercial activities that in aggregate can be 
reasonably assumed to have a substantive effect on interstate commerce--the Court paid its dues to 
the limit that lies at the heart of the Commerce Clause. It has readily recognized that the Commerce 
Clause was not a blank check under which Congress can enact laws that regulated activities such as those 
that are strictly criminal in nature. It also has consistently emphasized that the relationship between 
the regulated activity and interstate commerce has to be substantial at the minimum. Furthermore, 
as noted by Justice Jackson in Wickard, the Court trusted that the effective restraints on the exercise 
of the Commerce Clause will also be instituted by the political process inherent in the congressional 
deliberation and legislation. This paper does not deny that the attitude toward the Commerce Clause has 
evolved since 1935. Rather, it questions whether worries prominently expressed by Justice Thomas are 
justified and whether the Court’s precedents show certain stability in its interpretation of the Clause. We 
have seen that there does exist a connecting thread; the Court has continuously held that Congress may 
regulate only interstate commerce and those activities that strongly affected interstate commerce. As far 
as we can see, there is no indication that the Court has ever been willing to entirely compromise the State 
sovereignty for the benefit of creating the ever-more powerful central government. 
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